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Two studies examined differences in the cognition of golfers with differing levels of
expertise in high and low pressure situations. In study 1, six high skill and six low skill
golfers performed six holes of golf, while verbalizing their thoughts using Think Aloud
(TA) protocol. Higher skilled golfers’ cognitive processes centered more on planning in
comparison to lower skilled golfers. Study 2 investigated whether thought processes of
golfers changed in response to competitive pressure. Eight high skill and eight moderate
skilled golfers, completed a practice round and a competition round whilst verbalizing
thoughts using TA. To create pressure in the competition condition, participants were
instructed that monetary prizes would be awarded to the top three performers and
scores of all golfers would be published in a league table in the club house. When
performing under competitive pressure, it was found that higher skilled golfers were
more likely to verbalize technical rules compared to practice conditions, especially during
putting performance. This shift in cognition toward more technical aspects of motor
performance was strongly related to scores on the Decision Specific Reinvestment
Scale, suggesting individuals with a higher propensity for reinvestment show the largest
changes in cognition under pressure. From a practical perspective, TA can aid a
player, coach or sport psychologist by allowing thought processes to be identified and
investigate a performer’s thoughts when faced with the pressure of a competition.
Keywords: Think Aloud, verbal protocol, motor task, golf, cognitive processes, expertise, reinvestment, stress
INTRODUCTION
Recent research (Whitehead et al., 2015) has encouraged the use of Ericsson and Simon’s (1980)
Think Aloud (TA) protocol to record the cognitive processes of sports men and women during
task performance. TA involves individuals continuously reporting their thoughts during the
performance of a task (Ericsson and Simon, 1993). Little research has used TA to investigate
cognition in sport. However, there are several studies employing TA in other domains such as chess
(Gobet and Charness, 2006), medicine (Ericsson, 2004, 2007), nursing (Aitken and Mardegan,
2000), Scrabble (Tuﬃash et al., 2007), and algebra tasks (Cook, 2006).
Whitehead et al. (2015) argued, that if the thoughts of sport performers were recorded during
the performance of a task using TA, then this could be used to better understand cognition in
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1974
Whitehead et al. Expertise Differences and Competitive Pressure
sporting events. Much of the research investigating cognition in
sport employs either laboratory based studies using simulated
sport situations that lack ecological validity (e.g., McRobert et al.,
2007) or retrospective methods for recording thoughts (e.g.,
Macquet, 2009; Cotterill et al., 2010; Mulligan et al., 2012).
Laboratory based studies that employ unrealistic sports tasks
or situations are limited in advancing a clear understanding
of the cognitions of sportsmen and women if tasks are
not representative of true sport tasks. Similarly, there are
limitations with studies that employ retrospective methods,
where participants are interviewed after the completion of a
sports event to ascertain their thoughts during that event. This
approach may lead to memory decay (Ericsson and Simon,
1980; Nicholls and Polman, 2008) or distorted reports by
knowledge about task success (Brown and Harris, 1978). For
example, Whitehead et al. (2015) showed that the use of TA
in golf produces richer verbal data regarding decisions than
retrospective methods. In this study, participants’ recall of
thoughts after the completion of a round of golf had low levels of
similarity (38–41%) with what was verbalized in event using TA.
There are concerns that asking performers to TA may disrupt
motor task performance (Calmeiro and Tenenbaum, 2011),
since TA may promote a more inward focus of attention that
could lead to reinvestment in explicit rules (Whitehead et al.,
2015). However, recent research has shown that golf putting
performance was not negatively impacted by asking participants
to TA when putting (Arsal, 2013; Whitehead et al., 2015).
Whitehead and colleagues also found no clear evidence for
reinvestment when thinking aloud, since golfers verbalized very
few thoughts about technical aspects of the putting stroke when
thinking aloud. The evidence to date, suggests TAmay be a useful
methodology for exploring cognition of sport performers and
does not harm performance.
Think Aloud may be a particularly useful method for
investigating diﬀerences in the cognition of sports performers
of various levels of ability. Signiﬁcant debate still exist around
which theory best explains how motor skills are acquired (e.g.,
Rose and Christina, 2006). However, a number of models have
been proposed which mainly describe the behavioral changes
that occur during the learning process. The most relevant model
for the present study is that put forward by Fitts and Posner
(1967) which considers both cognitive and behavioral aspects and
proposes that a learner moves through three stages of learning,
from cognitive, associative to autonomous. Other models, such
as Gentile’s (1972) two stage model also provides a similar
process of skill development.However, this model emphasizes the
environment and how this inﬂuences goal achievement (mainly
behaviourally oriented). The ecological or dynamical systems
perspective (e.g., Kam et al., 1990) focusses on the changing
nature of perception and action dynamics of the environment
with little emphasis on cognitions.
According to Fitts and Posner (1967) at the cognitive stage
a novice’s performance is based on a set of cognitive rules
and performance is controlled in a step-by-step fashion. The
associative phase is where the performer starts to gain a better
understanding of the task and movement patterns become
more reﬁned. Finally, the autonomous phase is where skill
execution is fully automatic and conscious attentional control
is no longer required to execute a particular action. What a
performer cognitively attends to throughout performance will
diﬀer depending on where they are on this skill continuum.
To capture these cognitions, TA could be used. For example,
Calmeiro and Tenenbaum (2011) demonstrated how TA could
be used to capture diﬀerences in the cognitions of three
experienced and three novice golfers when performing a putting
task. Findings revealed that, experienced golfers spent more
time than beginners assessing conditions and planning prior
to a putt and verbalized more diagnostic-related thoughts and
planning of the next putt following the putt execution. This
ﬁnding was consistent with McPherson (2000) and suggests
that information concerning past performance outcomes is
used more by experienced players to diagnose and update
subsequent performance strategies. In contrast, low skilled golfers
focused more on the technical aspect of the putt. Calmeiro
and Tenenbaum (2011) suggest that in line with previous
models of skill acquisition, experienced players did not engage
in technical instruction, which might indicate a higher degree
of automaticity of motor control where the performer’s skill is
controlled by procedural knowledge and in the automatic phase.
In comparison, the verbalization of more technical instructions
by novices, indicates skill execution is controlled more by
declarative knowledge that is attended to in a step-by-step fashion
(Fitts and Posner, 1967; Anderson and Lebiere, 1998).
Calmeiro and Tenenbaum’s (2011) research was an original
and novel investigation, however, the expertise level and the
sample size of the two groups are questionable. Particularly, in
the high skilled (HS) group there were three performers with
handicaps of 0, 13, and 18. A handicap of zero and 18 represent
an extremely diﬀerent level of performance. In addition, whilst
this study provides an important insight into skill level diﬀerences
in decision making of golfers, the very small sample size limits
the generalizability of ﬁndings. Additionally, the study was
conducted in an artiﬁcial setting and therefore, there is a necessity
for this type of work to be conducted with larger sample sizes and
in a more ecologically valid environment, such as a real life golf
course.
It is important to note that skilled performers in the
autonomous phase of learning may still encounter skill
breakdown and skill regression when performing in what they
may perceived as a high stress situation (Masters, 1992). This
has also been termed as choking, which refers to the decrease
in athletic performance because of disruption in the execution
of habitual processes under situations of stress or pressure
(Beilock and Gray, 2012). Masters (1992) has also termed this
type of behavior as reinvestment. Reinvestment theory (Masters,
1992) predicts that during times of stress, changes occur in
cognitive processing. That is, the automaticity of a task becomes
undone or disrupted as the performer tries to control a task
or action consciously with declarative knowledge. According
to Masters (1992), skilled performers may regress to an earlier
stage of learning when performing a task in a stressful situation.
A disruption in performance occurs when an ‘integrated’ real
time control structure that can run as an uninterrupted unit (e.g.,
a professional golfer driving oﬀ the tee) is broken down back
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into smaller, separate independent units, similar to how it was
originally attended to in a step-by-step fashion during the early
stages of skill learning. This in turn slows down performance as
each component is run separately instead of all together. As a
result there is a gap in each unit which creates more room for
error, which would not be present in the integrated autonomous
structure (Masters, 1992; Beilock and Carr, 2001). Therefore, if a
performer’s motor movement is broken down, then the cognitive
process of a performer would be more likely to be focussed on
the internal mechanics of a skill rather than external factors such
as planning or where to aim. For example, Nicholls and Polman
(2008) found that when under stress, high level golfers reverted to
a high frequency of swing thoughts, which are technical thoughts
about their performance and this was evident when they were
asked to TA and verbalize their thought processes. The use
of TA may help to further the understanding of choking and
reinvestment in sport (Kinrade et al., 2015).
Masters et al. (1993) suggested that reinvestment could
be a characteristic of personality and a 20-item scale was
initially developed to measure reinvestment. This scale was
found to correlate with performance decrements on motor
tasks under conditions of high stress (e.g., Chell et al., 2003;
Jackson et al., 2006). However, the scale was criticized since
it did not focus speciﬁcally on movement reinvestment and
therefore lacked face validity (Jackson et al., 2006). Masters
et al. (2005) subsequently developed a two factor movement
speciﬁc reinvestment scale. The ﬁrst factor of the scale measured
movement self-consciousness, which reﬂected concern about
style of movement and making a good impression in public.
The second factor measured conscious motor processing, which
reﬂected the contemplation of the process of movement (Masters
and Maxwell, 2008). This scale has been used primarily in
clinical studies rather than sport contexts. For example, medical
students scoring high on movement speciﬁc reinvestment tended
to show slower and less eﬃcient performance on a laparoscopy
task when under time pressure than students scoring low in
reinvestment (Malhotra et al., 2012). Further research is necessary
to understand how movement speciﬁc reinvestment relates to
changes in cognition when performing a sports task under
pressure.
More recently Kinrade et al. (2010) introduced the concept
of decision making reinvestment. They developed a Decision-
Speciﬁc Reinvestment Scale (DSRS) comprising of six items
speciﬁc to the conscious monitoring of the process involved
in making a decision (decision reinvestment). A second factor
which makes up the scale is decision rumination, which focusses
on negative evaluations of poor decisions. When validating this
scale, Kinrade et al. (2010) found that the scores of 59 skilled team
sports players correlated highly with coaches ratings of players’
tendency to choke under pressure. Further work by Kinrade
et al. (2015) indicated global scores on the DSRS predicted
actual choking under pressure on a computer-based complex
basketball decision making task. Speciﬁcally, decision rumination
predicted the breakdown of decision making under pressure on
a complex version of the task, but predicted faster completion
times on a simple versions of the task when under pressure. This
ﬁnding indicates decision making reinvestment only predicts
performance breakdown under pressure on complex tasks.
However, the computer based nature of the task lacked ecological
validity. Therefore, further work is necessary to investigate
changes in decision making under pressure on real sport tasks.
The present paper uses TA to further develop the
understanding of the cognition of sport performers in event.
Study 1 aims to extend the work of Calmeiro and Tenenbaum
(2011) by investigating the diﬀerences in decision making
processes between six high and six lower level golfers over six
full holes of golf, using the TA methodology. This extends the
previous work, as the study considers the whole game of golf,
rather than just one (putting). Based on Fitss and Posner’s model
of learning it was predicted that skilled golfers would verbalized
more thoughts around planning prior to shot execution and
evaluation post shot execution whereas, lower skilled golfers
would verbalized more technical thoughts. In Study 2, the aim
was to investigate whether stress through the introduction of
a competition with monetary prizes, inﬂuences the thought
process of golfers of diﬀering levels of skill; eight high and eight
intermediate. Speciﬁcally, the study aims to examine if there
is a tendency for reinvestment among higher skilled golfers,
when playing in a high stress situation, as evidenced by a
greater focus on technical aspects of their motor performance.
It was predicted that higher skilled golfers would verbalize
more technical thoughts during competition in comparison to
practice Furthermore, Study 2 investigated whether measures of
propensity for movement-speciﬁc reinvestment and decision-
speciﬁc reinvestment are related to greater focus on technique
when under stress. It was predicted that those who scores higher
on movement reinvestment and decision speciﬁc reinvestment
would revert to verbalizing more technical thoughts when in a
pressured situation such as a competition compared to those
scoring low.
STUDY 1
Previous literature, (Thomas and Over, 1994; Calmeiro and
Tenenbaum, 2011) has provided evidence that higher skilled
golfers spend more time planning and evaluating their shots.
Whereas lower skilled golfers spend more time devoted to the
technical mechanics of their performance. Such ﬁndings are in
line with Fitts and Posner’s (1967) model of skill development,
with lower skilled performers engaging in more conscious
cognitive control of motor task performance. However, much of
this research is based on retrospective reports (Thomas and Over,
1994) or conducted in an artiﬁcial setting, with a focus only on
the putting aspect of the game of golf (Calmeiro and Tenenbaum,
2011). Therefore, Study 1 aims to further previous research by
exploring the decision making process using TA when playing on
a real golf course. Based on previous research (Thomas and Over,
1994; Calmeiro and Tenenbaum, 2011) and Fitts and Posner’s
(1967) model, it was predicted that skilled golfers would focus
more on pre-shot planning, whereas less skilled golfers would
be more focused on the technical elements of playing a shot.
Furthermore, it was predicted that skilled golfers would verbalize
more thoughts in the evaluation of a shot, since skilled and
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experienced performers have been found to describe and evaluate
performance more than beginners in previous work (McPherson,
2000; Calmeiro and Tenenbaum, 2011).
Method
Participants
Participants were six male HS golfers (age:M = 16.33, SD = 0.51,
handicap: M = 4.16, SD = 0.75) and six male low skilled golfers
(age: M = 26.33, SD = 8.52, handicap: M = 20.16, SD = 5.34).
The study and protocol was approved by the University of Central
Lancashire ethics committee written consent was provided prior
to participation in the study.
Materials
Each golfer played with their own golf clubs on the same six
holes (1 par 5, 3 par 4’s and 2 par 3’s) of the same golf course
in North East England. Participants’ verbalizations were recorded
using a Sennheiser USA ENG G3 wireless digital voice recorder.
The recording device was placed in the pocket of the participant,
with a wire running inside the shirt connecting to a microphone
attached to the collar.
Procedure
Participants were initially briefed on how to conduct TA
(Ericsson and Simon, 1993). Participants then took part in a
series of TA exercises which included (1) counting the number
of dots on a page (2) an arithmetic exercise and (3) an anagram
problem-solving task, and were asked to TA when completing
the exercises. Each of the golfers then played six holes of golf
accompanied by an experimenter. Participants were instructed
to verbalize their thoughts continuously throughout the six
holes apart from when they were executing their shot. It is
important to note that participants were not instructed to
verbalize during shot execution to reduce any interference with
motor movement (Schmidt and Wrisberg, 2000). If they were
silent for a period of longer than 20 s they were asked to resume
thinking aloud.
Data Analysis
Each participant’s verbal reports from TA were transcribed
verbatim. Following checks for relevance and consistency each
transcript was subjected to a line by line content analysis
(Maykut and Morehouse, 1994) by the ﬁrst author to identify
verbalizations which related to the decision making process of
each shot played. Each verbalization was then grouped according
to a modiﬁed version of the coding scheme (see Table 1)
developed by Calmeiro and Tenenbaum (2011). The second
author coded a random sample of verbal data; the inter-rater
agreement was 95%.
Data was split into wood/iron shots and putting, with each
type of shot analyzed separately. High and low skilled golfers
were compared on the number of thoughts that were verbalized
per shot using Mann–Whitney tests, while Wilcoxon tests were
used for within person comparisons between number of thoughts
verbalized per shot for putts versus wood/iron shots. To analyze
the content of verbalizations the percentage of shots where a
theme was verbalized was calculated and Mann–Whitney tests
TABLE 1 | Themes used to code verbalizations.
Theme Description Example of raw data
quote
Gathering information Searching for relevant
characteristics of the
environment
“There’s a break left,”
“there is a tree on the
right” “the wind is
blowing left to right.”
Club selection Selecting a club for the
shot in hand
“I’m using a driver,” “I’m
using a 7 iron.”
Planning Referring to a plan of
action for a shot
“I’m aiming for the left
edge of the green,” “hit
firm at the hole”
Technical instruction Specified technical
aspects of the motor
performance
“Arms bent,” “feet are
parallel”
Shot evaluation Reflecting on and
evaluating a shot
“It broke at the end,”
“good putt,” “I’m on the
green.”
Pre-performance routinea Any sequence of task
relevant thoughts or
actions engaged in
systematically prior to a
shot.
“Just using my
pre-performance
routine,” “one, two,
three, putt.”
Dwellingb Reference to a previous
shot played during that
round of golf.
“Ahh I wish I had holed
that putt on the third,”
“if I hadn’t of sliced that
driver, I would be level
par now.”
aStudy 1 only. bStudy 2 only.
compared diﬀerences between high and low skilled golfers.
Mann–Whitney tests were used due to the small sample size and
non-normal distribution of data. Cohen’s (1994) δ eﬀect sizes
were calculated to establish the magnitude of diﬀerences between
high and low skilled golfers.
Results
Number of Thoughts
When playing wood/iron shots signiﬁcantly more thoughts per
shot (U = 3.00, P = 0.02, δ = 2.07) were verbalized by high skill
golfers (M = 4.25, SD = 0.71) than low skill golfers (M = 2.81,
SD = 0.69). When putting (M = 1.83, SD = 0.67) there were
fewer thoughts per shot compared to wood/iron shots (M = 3.52,
SD = 0.67), this diﬀerence was signiﬁcant (Z = 3.05., P = 0.002,
δ = 2.38). High skill golfers (M = 2.19, SD = 0.65) had more
thoughts per putt than low skill golfers (M = 1.47, SD = 0.42),
although the diﬀerence was not signiﬁcant (U = 8.00, P = 0.11,
δ = 1.34). All eﬀect sizes were large (Cohen, 1994) and ranged
from δ = 1.34–2.38.
Content of Verbalizations
For wood/iron shots high skill golfers Gathered information
on more shots (88 vs. 65%, U = 4.50, P = 0.03, δ = 0.84),
considered Club selection on more shots (72 vs. 39%, U = 3.00,
P = 0.02, δ = 2.39) and used Planning on more shots (82 vs.
52%, U < 0.001, P = 0.004, δ = 2.63) compared to the low
skill golfers (see Figure 1A). When putting high skill golfers
verbalized about Planning on a greater proportion of putts than
low skilled golfer (59 vs. 19%, U = 2.00, P = 0.01, δ = 2.38) (see
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FIGURE 1 | Percentage of shots where a theme was verbalized (Mean and SD) for High (HS) and Low Skill (LS) golfers when playing Woods/irons (A)
and Putting (B). (A) Significant Skill differences ∗P < 0.05, ∗∗P < 0.01. (B) Significant Skill differences ∗P < 0.05, ∗∗P < 0.01.
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Figure 1B). All eﬀect sizes were large (Cohen, 1994) and ranged
from δ = 0.84–2.63.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate the diﬀerence in
the decision making process between high and lower skilled
golfers over six full holes of golf using the TA methodology.
Higher skilled golfers provided more verbalizations per shot
taken than lower skilled golfers. As predicted higher skilled
golfers verbalized more about planning shots for both wood/iron
shots and putting, with eﬀect sizes large in both cases. Contrary
to predictions there was no evidence of higher skilled golfers
providing more verbalizations in the evaluation of a shot, in
addition lower level golfers did not verbalize more technical
thoughts. The results of the present study were consistent with
previous ﬁndings by Calmeiro and Tenenbaum (2011) who also
found that experienced players verbalized more about planning
their shot than lower skilled golfers when putting on an artiﬁcial
surface. HS participants in the current study also used more
planning strategies and goals which guided the execution of a
shot. This is also consistent with research by McPherson (2000)
who found that experienced, higher level tennis players planned
their actions based on sophisticated action plans whereas novices
rarely planned. These ﬁndings provide support for previous
research and theory (Fitts and Posner, 1967; Beilock et al.,
2002) that argues that performance in higher skilled performers
in the autonomous phase of skill learning is characterized by
less explicit cognition toward technique elements of motor
performance.
The present study demonstrates clear diﬀerences between the
thought patterns of high and low skill golfers with large eﬀect
sizes evident. It is clear that higher skill golfers focus more
on planning their shots and identifying appropriate strategies
to reach their desired goal. To our knowledge this is the
ﬁrst study which has applied TA to a more ecological valid
environment as a real life golf course. However, due to the
current study being conducted in a low pressure environment
it is important to develop this area of research even further
by looking at expertise diﬀerences in diﬀerent environments
such as competitive situations, as sport competitions are
situational contexts that induce pronounced stress, even in
elite athletes (Holt and Dunn, 2004; Gould and Maynard,
2009).
STUDY 2
The aim of Study 2 was to investigate whether stress through the
introduction of a competition with monetary prizes inﬂuenced
the thought process of golfers of diﬀering levels of skill. There
is evidence that reinvestment (Masters, 1992) may provide an
explanation for underperforming when exposed to pressure,
however, few studies have examined thought process during
times of pressure situations and how this inﬂuences the decision
making process. Masters (1992) proposed that during a stressful
event a high ability individual in the autonomous stage of
learning may experience self-directed attention, which may
cause a performer to reinvest thoughts about technique. This
inward focus may lead to a breakdown of automaticity since the
performer tries to consciously control task performance. For a
lower ability performer who is at the cognitive or associative stage
of learning this change in cognition under stress would be less
pronounced since lower skill performers consciously attend to
technical aspects of performance even in low stress situations.
Study 2 employs TA to examine changes in the cognition of
eight high and eight lower skilled golfers when playing six holes
of golf under pressure. In line with the theory of reinvestment
(Masters, 1992; Masters and Maxwell, 2008) it was predicted
that under stress higher skill golfers would verbalize more
thoughts about technique in comparison to practice conditions,
while lower skill golfers would not show this same change in
cognition.
A second aim was to investigate if measures of propensity for
reinvestment relate to greater focus on technique when under
stress. Individual diﬀerences in propensity for reinvestment
can be measured by the movement speciﬁc reinvestment scale
(Masters et al., 2005) or the decision speciﬁc reinvestment scale
(Kinrade et al., 2010). Higher scores on the movement speciﬁc
reinvestment scale have been linked with less eﬃcient motor
performance of surgeons on a laparoscopy task when under time
pressure (Malhotra et al., 2012), but no research has examined
if this scale relates speciﬁcally to changes in cognition under
stress on a sport task. The decision speciﬁc reinvestment scale has
been shown to predict performance breakdown under pressure
on a computer-based complex basketball decision making task
(Kinrade et al., 2015), but research on cognition on real sport
tasks is lacking. It was predicted that higher scores on both
the movement speciﬁc reinvestment scale and decision speciﬁc
reinvestment scale would relate tomore verbalization of technical
thoughts when under pressure.
Method
Participants
Participants were eight male high skill golfers (M age: 17.50,
SD = 1.19; M handicap: 2.25, SD = 1.75), and eight moderate
skill golfers (seven male, one female; M age: 17.25, SD = 0.46;
M handicap: 9.62, SD = 0.91) who were all members of the
same golf club. It is important to note participants in Study
2 were not involved in Study 1. The study and protocol
was approved by the University of Central Lancashire ethics
committee written consent was provided prior to participation
in the study.
Materials
Participants played with their own golf clubs on the same six
holes of the same golf course in North West England. The six
holes were all par 3. As in Study 1 participant’s verbalizations were
recorded using a Sennheiser USA ENG G3 wireless digital voice
recorder.
Each golfer completed the Decision Speciﬁc Reinvestment
Scale (DSRS; Kinrade et al., 2010). The 13-item DSRS assesses
an individual’s predisposition for exerting conscious control
over their decision-making process and consists of two factors.
Decision reinvestment assesses a respondent’s tendency to
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consciously monitor the processes leading up to the decision
whereas rumination measures the tendency to reﬂect upon
previous poor decisions. The DSRS is scored on a scale from 0 to
5, with 0 being extremely uncharacteristic to 5 being extremely
characteristic. Good reliability has been shown (Cronbach
α = 0.89 and 91 for the reinvestment and rumination factors
respectively). In addition the scale has shown adequate factorial
structure (Kinrade et al., 2010).
Procedure
Participants were initially briefed about the study and asked to
complete the DSRS (Kinrade et al., 2010). The study involved
performing the same six holes of golf on two separate occasions
separated by a week. On one occasion a practice round was
completed, and on the other occasion a competition round
was completed. The order that conditions were performed was
counterbalanced. The competition was run as a stroke play event,
with scores adjusted for handicap. A presentation ceremony took
place at the end of the competition with prizes for the top three
performers of £100, £70 and £30. The pressure manipulation
phase of this study was similar to previous work by Vine and
Wilson (2010) and Vine et al. (2011). They created cognitive
anxiety through setting up a competition whereby participants
were informed that the individuals with the best performance
would receive a £50 prize (in our case £100 for ﬁrst, £70
for second and £30 for third place). Similarly, in the current
study participants were told the competition was built into
their curriculum. As they were all part of a further education
golf college their lecturer made them aware that this was a
competition and it would replace their normal timetable on the
speciﬁc days. Participants were notiﬁed that their scores would
be presented back to the whole class the following week to be
reviewed. As in Study 1, participants were instructed on how
to conduct TA and took part in a series of three TA exercises
prior to each round. Each of the golfers played each round of six
holes accompanied by the experimenter and were instructed to
verbalize their thoughts continuously throughout the six holes
apart from when they were executing their shot. If they were
silent for a period of longer than 20 s they were asked to resume
thinking aloud.
Data Analysis
The same method of data transcription and thematic coding
used in Study 1 was applied. The coding scheme was modiﬁed
slightly, with ‘dwelling’ added to the coding scheme due to
this emerging frequently in this speciﬁc data set. Examples of
dwelling from the transcribed verbalizations included “Ahh I
wish I had holed that putt on the 3rd,” “If I hadn’t of sliced
that driver, I would be level par now.” Pre-performance routine
was removed from the coding scheme due to the absence of this
theme in this data set. The second author independently analyzed
a 10% sample of the raw data. The inter-rater agreement was
95%.
As in Study 1 wood/iron shots and putts were analyzed
separately. High and moderate skill golfers were compared
on the number of thoughts per shot during practice and
then competition using Mann–Whitney tests, and within
person comparisons between practice and competition for
high skill golfers and moderate skill golfers were made using
Wilcoxon tests. The content of verbalizations was analyzed
by calculating the percentage of shots where each theme was
verbalized, with Mann–Whitney tests used to analyze skill
level diﬀerences for each theme during practice and then
during competition, and Wilcoxon tests used to analyze within
person diﬀerences for verbalizations made during practice and
competition for high level golfers and for moderate skill golfers.
Cohen’s (1994) δ eﬀect sizes were calculated to establish the
magnitude of each eﬀect. Finally, to analyze if propensity for
reinvestment was associated with more thoughts about technical
aspects of a shot, Spearman’s correlations were conducted
between the decision reinvestment and rumination scores
from the DSRS and the percentage of shots where technical
thoughts were verbalized. Again, this was done separately for
putts and wood/iron shots, and for separate practice and
competition conditions for both high and intermediate level
performers.
Results
Number of Thoughts
High skilled golfers tended to verbalize more thoughts per
shot than moderate skilled (MS) golfers. This was the case for
putts in both practice (U = 5.50, P = 0.005, δ = 1.82; HS:
M = 2.68, SD = 0.47; MS:M = 1.85, SD = 0.44) and competition
(U = 13.50, P = 0.05, δ = 1.21; HS: M = 2.61, SD = 0.56; MS:
M = 1.96, SD = 0.51), and for woods/irons in practice (U = 9.50,
P = 0.02, δ = 0.65; HS: M = 3.82, SD = 0.52; MS: M = 3.03,
SD= 0.72) but not in competition (U = 19.50, P= 0.16, δ= 0.62;
HS: M = 3.38, SD = 0.47; MS: M = 3.02, SD = 0.69). There
was no diﬀerence in number of thoughts verbalized per shot
between practice and competition for moderate skill golfers when
putting (Z = 0.63, P = 0.53, δ = 0.02) or playing wood/iron
shots (Z = 0.28, P = 0.78, δ = 0.22). For high skill golfers, there
were more thoughts per shot in practice than competition when
playing wood/iron shots (Z = 1.96, P = 0.05, δ = 0.74), but
no diﬀerence when putting (Z = 0.34, P = 0.74, δ = 0.14). All
signiﬁcant diﬀerences also showed large eﬀect sizes ranging from
δ = 0.65 to 1.82 (Cohen, 1994).
Content of Verbalizations
Figure 2 shows the percentage of shots where each theme was
verbalized during putting and wood/iron shots for high and
moderate skill golfers in both practice and competition. To
analyze skill level diﬀerences, the verbalizations of high and
moderate skill golfers were compared for the practice round
and then for the competition round using Mann–Whitney tests.
During the practice round signiﬁcant diﬀerences were found
for the themes Club selection (U = 12, P = 0.03, δ = 1.23)
and Planning (U = 5.00, P = 0.004, δ = 2.08) for wood/iron
shots and Planning (U = 2.00, P = 0.002, δ = 2.61) and
Evaluation (U = 2.00, P = 0.002, δ = 2.13) for putting. High
skill golfers verbalized more thoughts than moderate skill golfers
about Club selection (67 vs. 43%) and Planning (93 vs. 66%)
on wood/iron shots and more thoughts about Planning (76
vs. 40%) and Evaluation (88 vs. 56%) when putting. For the
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FIGURE 2 | Percentage of shots where a theme was verbalized (Mean and SD) for High (HS) and Moderate Skill (MS) golfers in Practice and
Competition when playing Woods/irons (A) and Putting (B). (A) Significant Condition differences ∗P < 0.05. Significant skill differences #P < 0.05, ##P < 0.01.
(B) Significant condition differences ∗P < 0.05. Significant skill differences #P < 0.05, ##P < 0.01.
competition round, the only signiﬁcant diﬀerence found was
for Planning during putting (U = 10.0; P = 0.02, δ = 1.46),
with high skill golfers using Planning on more putts than the
moderate skill golfers (79 vs. 46%). All signiﬁcant diﬀerences
showed large eﬀect sizes ranging from δ = 1.23 to 2.61 (Cohen,
1994).
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To analyze if playing in competition inﬂuenced thoughts,
diﬀerences in verbalizations were compared between the practice
and competition conditions for the high skill golfers and then
moderate skill golfers separately using Wilcoxen tests. For high
level golfers there was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the theme
Gathering information (Z = −2.03, P = 0.02, δ = 1.16) when
hitting wood/iron shots, with gathering information verbalized
on more shots in practice than competition (87 vs. 61%).
A signiﬁcant diﬀerence was also found in the theme Technical
instruction during putting (Z = −2.03, P = 0.04, δ = 1.14), with
more technical instruction used during competition than practice
(9 vs. 1%). Eﬀect sizes were large in both comparisons (Cohen,
1994). For moderate skill golfers no signiﬁcant diﬀerences were
found for any theme between practice and competition.
Correlation Analysis
To establish if propensity for reinvestment was associated
with golfers verbalizing more thoughts about technical aspects
of a golf shot during competition a correlation analysis was
conducted. The diﬀerence score for percentage of shots where
technical instruction was verbalized in competition minus
practice was calculated for each participant for both putts and
wood/iron shots. A higher diﬀerence score would indicate more
verbalizations of technical instructions in competition compared
to practice, hence suggesting reinvestment when playing in a
competition. Spearman correlations were conducted between
technical instruction diﬀerence scores, the two factors of the
DSRS (decision reinvestment and decision rumination), and
the two factors of the MSRS (conscious motor processing, self-
consciousness). This was done separately for wood/iron shots and
putts for both high and moderate skill golfers (see Table 2).
Decision specific reinvestment
For high skill golfers it was found that decision reinvestment
had a strong positive relationship with technical instruction
verbalizations when putting (rs = 0.84, p = 0.008), but only a
weak relationship for wood/iron shots (rs = 0.29, p = 0.49). For
moderate skill participants decision reinvestment had a strong
positive relationship with technical instruction verbalizations
during wood/iron shots (rs = 0.70, p = 0.05), but not for putts
(rs = 0.07, p = 0.87). Decision rumination was not related to
technical instruction for either skill level on any type of shot.
Movement specific reinvestment
For high skill performers conscious motor processing was
moderately positively correlated with technical instruction
verbalizations for wood/irons (rs = 0.44, p = 0.27) and for putts
(rs = 0.31, p = 0.46), although in each case the relationship
was non-signiﬁcant. There were no clear relationships between
conscious motor processing and technical instructions verbalized
on either putts or woods/irons for moderate skill golfers. Self-
consciousness was not related to technical instructions for either
the high skill or moderate skill group on any shot type. There
was a strong positive relationship between conscious motor
processing and self-consciousness for both high (rs = 0.90,
p = 0.002) and moderate skill golfers (rs = 0.93, p = 0.001).
Discussion
Study 2 aimed to investigate whether the introduction of
competitive pressure inﬂuenced performance and thought
process in high and moderate skill golfers. Results support the
main hypothesis, under competitive pressure HS golfers were
more likely to verbalize technical rules and refer to step-by-
step mechanics of their swing in comparison to normal practice
conditions as indicated by a large eﬀect size, while this change in
cognition was not apparent for lower skill golfers. This ﬁnding
was most pronounced when putting than when playing wood
iron shots. Such ﬁndings are line with the theory of reinvestment
(Masters, 1992; Masters and Maxwell, 2008), since a breakdown
in cognition under pressure is only predicted for higher skill
performers who are at the autonomous stage of learning (Fitts
and Posner, 1967) and would normally perform a motor task
automatically without conscious thought of movement processes.
When under pressure there is an inward shift in attention toward
the control of the body in an attempt to consciously control task
performance.
The second aim of the study was to investigate if measures
of propensity for reinvestment related to greater focus on
technique when under stress. Findings showed that higher scores
on decision reinvestment subscale of the DSRS were strongly
associated with more technical thoughts during performance for
high skill performers when putting and for low skill performers
when playing wood and iron shots. Measures of movement
speciﬁc reinvestmentwere not associatedwith changes in thought
patterns under competitive pressure. This ﬁnding extends the
work of Kinrade et al. (2015) who showed that performance
breakdown on a simulated basketball decision making task was
better predicted by the DSRS than the original reinvestment scale
of Masters et al. (1993).
This study presented a number of important ﬁndings. First,
when faced with the pressure of a competition higher skill golfers’
thought process changed and regressed to a less automatic and
more technical step-by-step process. Secondly, clear diﬀerences
in the thought processes of high and intermediate level golfers
during both practice and competition were found, with less
planning of shots conducted by lower skill golfers. Finally,
propensity for decision reinvestment was a strong correlate of
changes in cognition toward a more technique focus when under
competitive pressure.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current study has progressed previous research around
cognitive processing and expertise within sport by moving away
from laboratory based artiﬁcial studies and moving into more
ecologically valid environments where cognition is measured
during the performance of a real sport task using TA. Findings
provide evidence of skill level diﬀerences in cognition during
sport performance, and changes in cognition as a result of
competitive pressure among high skill performers.
We present evidence to support Fitts and Posner’s (1967)
stage model of motor learning. At later stages of learning
performance was guided by procedural knowledge where
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics and Spearman correlation coefficients for measures of reinvestment and technical instruction.
Variable Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5
High skill
(1) TI puttingcpd 7.63 (8.55)
(2) TI wood/ironscpd 8.88 (20.74) 0.71∗
(3) Decision reinvestment 12.50 (3.25) 0.85∗∗ 0.29
(4) Decision rumination 13.63 (2.07) −0.04 0.14 −0.05
(5) Self-consciousness 35.25 (6.84) 0.04 0.24 −0.08 −0.33
(6) Conscious motor processing 15.75 (4.03) 0.31 0.44 0.19 −0.04 0.90∗∗
Moderate skill
(1) TI puttingcpd 0.50 (5.18)
(2) TI wood/ironscpd −1.63 (18.88) 0.03
(3) Decision reinvestment 10.63 (2.87) 0.07 0.70
(4) Decision rumination 16.50 (4.11) −0.02 0.08 0.29
(5) Self-consciousness 35.88 (5.11) −0.07 −0.17 0.24 −0.47
(6) Conscious motor processing 15.80 (4.83) −0.27 −0.29 0.20 −0.43 0.93∗∗
TI puttingcpd is the difference score for percentage of putting shots where technical instruction is verbalized in competition minus practice. TI wood/ironscpd is the
difference score for percentage of wood/iron shots where technical instruction is verbalized in competition minus practice. ∗P < 0.05, ∗∗P < 0.01.
appropriate strategies were used to achieve the desired goal.
We also present evidence to support Masters (1992) theory of
reinvestment. When high skill golfers were put in a pressurized
competitive environment we found evidence of reinvestment,
with more verbalizations about technical elements of a shot
than in a low pressure environment. This suggests that under
stress higher skill performers at a later stage of learning may
regress in their thoughts to an earlier stage of learning where
conscious control of motor performance is more prevalent. This
ﬁnding was strongest for performers scoring high on the decision
reinvestment subscale of the DSRS (Kinrade et al., 2010), and
suggests this may be a useful tool for identifying people at greater
risk for reinvestment in high pressure environments.
This paper has provided a signiﬁcant original contribution
to the current sport psychology literature by providing an
understanding of diﬀering skill level golfers thought process
within real time and in an ecologically valid environment.
The paper further advances our understanding of cognitive
process during performance as much of the current and previous
literature investigating cognitive diﬀerences has been conducted
in a laboratory setting or used retrospective methods. In
addition, we have established the DSRS may be used to identify
people more prone to internalize thoughts and reinvest during
competition, and thus may be of use to coaches and sport
psychologists.
Although this paper has provided a signiﬁcant contribution
to the current sport psychology literature it is important to
acknowledge its limitations. One limitation is the assumption
that the higher level golfers are in the autonomous phase of
learning as this was not tested before data collection commenced
(Fitts and Posner, 1967). Future studies might consider having
a larger range of abilities (golf handicaps). For example, using
participants with lower handicaps in comparison to those who
have never played golf before (true novices). It is important
to acknowledge the relatively small sample sizes and limited
statistical power of the analyses, however, large eﬀect sizes were
consistently found for the diﬀerences in verbalizations of higher
and lower skilled golfers and diﬀerences between practice and
competition conditions. The sample size is still a progression
and improvement in comparison to similar previous research.
For example, Calmeiro and Tenenbaum’s (2011) ‘experienced’
group consisted of three participants with a mean handicap
of 10.3, whereas the current study had six participants in the
experienced group with a mean handicap of four. Furthermore,
Study 2 aimed to put diﬀering levels of golfers under higher
levels of pressure through their participation in a competitive
situation. It is recommended that future research examines the
extent to which these performers perceive the competition as a
stressful or anxious situation and one way of doing that would
be for participants to complete a pre-performance questionnaire
such as the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory- 2R (Cox
et al., 2003). In addition attaching heart rate monitors to
participants and collecting salivary cortisol samples (Coetzee,
2011) during practice and competition would also provide a
physiological variable which could be used to measure stress
levels.
A further limitation of the work is that decision making is not
always a conscious process and TA cannot assess what happens to
the decision making process outside of awareness (Bowers et al.,
1990; Jacoby et al., 1992; Wegner, 1994). That being said, both
studies were aiming to identify what the performer consciously
attends to and uncover the diﬀerences between two skill levels.
Study 2 used a counterbalancing design. Such a design might
result in an alteration in the meaning of practice for those who
engaged in the competition round ﬁrst. Although we believe this
is the most appropriate design for this type of studies future
studies could examine qualitatively the perceptions of the golfers
on this issue.
An important issue for future research would also to consider
the inﬂuence of gender. There is evidence that males and females
cope diﬀerently with stressful encounters in sport (Nicholls and
Polman, 2007). However, it is unclear whether diﬀerences exist in
decision making and how stress might inﬂuence this process for
male and female athletes.
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CONCLUSION
Collective ﬁndings have provided further support for the
cognitive diﬀerences between diﬀering levels of golfers.
Through using TA our studies have been able to collect rich
verbal data from diﬀering levels of golfers and provide clear
diﬀerences between high, moderate and low skilled performers.
Furthermore, through the use of TA we have also been able
to identify how a stressful environment such as a competition
can change a performer’s thought processes depending on their
level of expertise. We have also shown that changes in decision
making under pressure are strongly associated with propensity
for reinvestment as measured by the DSRS (Kinrade et al., 2010).
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